Three of the following statements, assuming they are true, provide evidence that using stock options to remunerate senior executives may prove ineffective in encouraging long-term strategic management thinking. Which one does not provide such evidence?Studies have suggested that executive stock options can incentivise managers to pursue strategies that will boost share prices even though they entail systematic risk (which cannot be offset). Stock options discourage strategies that entail idiosyncratic risk (which can be more easily offset, but at a cost to the firm).Many executive compensation packages include “reset” and "reload" clauses in the event of a decline or increase in share price, allowing them to profit from near term directions in share price.Studies have shown that management tends to make poor market-timing decisions when repurchasing stock (share buybacks) in an attempt to boost share price. Often when management opts to buy back shares, the share price subsequently declines.The vesting period of most executive stock options is within one to five years of their issuance.